This paper is a positive theory of the distribution of income and the growth rate of the economy. It builds on our earlier work, Meltzer and Richard (1981) , on the size of government. How does the distribution of income change as an economy grows? To answer this question we build a model of a labor economy in which consumers have diverse productivity. The government imposes a linear income tax which funds equal per capita redistribution. The tax rate is set in a sequence of single issue election in which the median productivity individual is decisive. Economic growth is the result of using a learning by doing technology, so higher taxes discourage labor causing the growth rate of the economy to fall. The distribution of productivity can widen due to increased technological specialization. This causes voters to raise the equilibrium tax rate and reduce growth. The distribution of pre-tax income widens. We estimate the model using data from the U.S., U.K. and France with excellent results.
Introduction
How does the distribution of income change as economic growth changes? How does growth change when governments raise tax rates to …nance increased redistribution? Economists have discussed these issues for decades, and they have recently become major political issues in developed economies.
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To answer these questions, we analyze a general equilibrium model of a labor economy in which consumers di¤er in their relative productivity. The wage rate is equal to absolute productivity so a consumers labor income is the wage rate multiplied by his relative productivity adjusted labor. A linear tax rate on labor income …nances government spending for redistribution; the real government budget is balanced. Tax increases lower aggregate hours worked, hence lowering current aggregate income and consumption. Learning-by-doing is the source of economic growth in our model.
Absolute productivity increases with the total amount of productivity adjusted labor expended. Hence increased taxes and redistribution reduces the growth rate and widens the spread in the income distribution. Reducing tax rates and redistribution brings the opposite response. Voters face a trade-o¤ of more current redistribution versus a higher growth rate of wages. As in our earlier work, Meltzer and Richard (1981) , the median income voter is decisive in a series of single issue elections to choose the tax rate.
We estimate the model using data for the U.S., the U.K., and France. The data strongly support the model. As well, they support Kuznets (1955) conclusions about the relation of growth to changes in relative incomes.
A Selective Literature Survey
The literature on economic growth and redistribution is large and varied. We report on a sample that covers di¤erent approaches and reaches very di¤erent conclusions.
In a 1955 paper, Simon Kuznets used his extensive knowledge of income data to conclude that economic growth …rst increases the spread in the income distribution. The reason is that when many unskilled workers enter the labor force, the economy grows, pro…ts rise, and higher incomes increase relatively and absolutely. As workers acquire skills, their productivity and real wages increase relative to pro…ts, so the spread of the income distribution declines. Kuznets' conclusion has remained contentious in part because he did not produce a model showing that his result held in general equilibrium and in part because of the paucity of data he had available.
Many years later, Arthur Okun (1975) discussed the social decision of trading some e¢ ciency or growth for more redistribution achieved by taxing higher incomes. His discussion makes the cost, called the leaky bucket, exceed the amount redistributed. His analysis, like Kuznets, concerns a one-time choice.
Our earlier work Meltzer and Richard (1981) departs from these ideas. In a functioning democratic system, voters make the choice repeatedly not once and for all times. They know their position but are uncertain about their and their children's future. The political choice of redistribution is like economic decisions that optimizing consumers make repeatedly. They vote either to increase current consumption by voting for a higher tax rate or they vote for growth and increased future consumption by lowering tax rates and spending. Although our earlier model is static, it is consistent with voter's decisions. Sometimes they vote for higher tax rates and spending and sometimes they do the opposite. No society chooses once for all future time.
Much of the recent literature on economic growth focusses on the role of capital as summarized in the in ‡uential book by Acemoglu (2009) . We think that the emphasis in explaining growth should be on labor productivity not capital. Over the past 200 years real wages have increased 20 fold while the return to capital has remained basically unchanged. Politically, if capital determines growth it is di¢ cult to understand why the taxes on capital income have risen, especially since capital is owned almost exclusively by the upper half of the income distribution. So we choose to ignore capital and focus on labor productivity as the exclusive engine of growth.
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Treatment of high incomes as rent permits increased taxation to …nance redistribution without reducing productive activity. A special use of rents is the claim that most high incomes result from inheritance of wealth produced by an earlier generation and passed on. Evidence does not support this claim both in the U.S. and other developed countries. Kaplan and Rauh, (2013, 46, 48) ; Tomes (1979, 1158) . Some work suggests that culture and educational attainment of parents has more important in ‡uence on later generations than …nancial inheritance. Tomes (1979, 1191) , Corak (2013, 80) Another problem with treating high incomes, for example those of the top one percent, as rent is that the population is not …xed but changes. Piketty (2014, 115-16) writes that capital transforms "itself into rents as it accumulates in large enough amounts." Saez (2013, 24) concludes that "high top tax rates reduce the pre-tax income gap without visible e¤ect on economic growth." Corak (2013) shows that intergenerational mobility remains large in developed countries like the U.S. and Canada. The main exception in the U.S. is the "least advantaged." In this paper we address the issue of why some of the least advantaged have stagnant incomes. The least productive choose not to work, so their incomes are all redistribution. Hence they do not acquire productive skills.
Much of the discussion of the top one percent makes no mention of the other 99 percent. Often, the focus is on income from capital, which neglects labor income, about 70% of total income. A very di¤erent explanation of the rising share of income earned by the top one percent builds on work on superstars by Rosen (1981) . Rosen argued that technological change increases the relative productivity of individuals with exceptional talent in using and developing the new technology. Rosen's work brings in relative productivity as an explanation of the rising share of the top one percent. Developing new software, like Steve Jobs and others, that create entire markets brings high rewards. Successfully managing a bank or corporation with branches in 50 or 100 countries is an order of magnitude more di¢ cult than managing in a single country or state. Ten years is a long tenure in such jobs, so there is turnover not inheritance of high income positions. Highly skilled surgeons adept at operating new technologies should be included.
Major league sport stars in football, baseball, soccer, basketball and hockey no longer perform before audiences restricted to a stadium. Television increased their productivity. Kaplan and Rauh (2013, 42, Figure 3) show the substantial increase in their incomes. Turnover is high; careers at the top are brief. And there is little evidence that the super stars cede their places to their o¤spring. Rock musicians and entertainment stars often have similar careers with high incomes for short duration. Income of super stars may explain some of the increase in the relative earnings of the top one percent. We doubt that it is a full explanation because the data after 1980 show that the rise in the pretax share of the top one percent can be seen in data for the United States, the United Kingdoms, Canada and Sweden but data for France and the Netherlands do not show a similar increase. Roine and Waldenstrom (2006) The share of pre-tax incomes received by the top one percent includes income from reported capital gains. That makes it more volatile, rising in periods when owners of shares choose to report gains in excess of losses. Also there are substantial di¤erences in the relative shares of di¤erent income quintiles when before and after tax and transfers are included. Most economic theory considers consumption, based on permanent not current income, to be a better measure of the economic component of well-being. The range of data in Table 1 is the range given by CBO. We chose 1989 because it was the end of the Reagan growth years. We chose 2007 because it is the peak year for the income share going to the top one percent. That year is also the peak year for the after tax share of the top one percent.
The table makes clear that it matters considerably whether analysis uses before or after tax income shares. Conceptually, income after tax and transfer is closer to consumption. By 2010 the share of after tax income received by the lowest 20 percent (6.2 percent) is the same as the before tax share received in 1979. Income shares for the lowest and middle 20% fall until 2007, then rise; the share of top one percent and 20 percent rise to 2007, then fall. Most of the rise occurs during the period of relatively high growth in the 1990s. The change is not likely to re ‡ect changes in the return to capital. The data seems more consistent with productivity growth during the boom years.
Of interest in relation to recent discussion, the share of the upper income groups declined from 2007 to 2010. These are years of relatively slow growth combined with increased returns to equity capital and a recovery in many house prices. Again, this suggests that productivity growth is more important than return to capital in explaining income shares.
A main theme of Piketty's (2014 and elsewhere) work is that the tax rates on income and wealth should be raised even though, at some points, he recognizes that the higher rates would lower top incomes but not provide much revenue. Few of the many discussions of his work point out that the choice of tax rate should be an implication of a utility maximizing model, preferably a general equilibrium model, such as in this paper.
Long before the Piketty book stimulated renewed interest in income distribution and the choice of tax rate, Tomes (1979, 1986) developed general equilibrium models of income distribution across family generations. Becker and Tomes (1979) 1175 choose a linear tax structure and use revenues for redistribution. They …nd that "even a progressive tax and public expenditure system may widen the inequality of disposable income." Becker and Tomes (1986, 533-4) note that some empirical work by Arthur Goldberger found that the widening of inequality does not occur for several generations. Alesina and Rodick (1994) use a growth model. As in Meltzer and Richard (1981) voters di¤er in their endowments, some prefer more, some less, taxation and government spending. The authors show that, in general, voters will not maximize economic growth. Instead, they vote to tax capital to …nance redistribution. As in all general equilibrium models, the budget is balanced.
Alesina and Rodrik use the Gini coe¢ cient to measure income inequality. They show empirically that income inequality is negatively related to future economic growth. The reason is that as income inequality rises, voters choose more redistribution, reducing the growth rate.
May increased government spending and taxation increase both growth and redistribution? Of course, it may, but the empirical data in Alesina and Rodrik and elsewhere shows that, in developed economies, the reverse is true. Government spending is mainly for redistribution to augment consumption.
Our contribution to this research builds on the …ndings in Alesina and Rodrik but incorporates some of the principal ideas o¤ered by Simon Kuznets in his insightful discussions. Kuznets (1979) contains several of his essays. In particular we incorporate technological change Kuznets (1979, 45) as a major source of income growth with substantial e¤ects on income distribution that are not explicitly considered in much of the literature.
In our model, growth of labor productivity and labor income -learning by doing -is a large factor, the largest, in explaining growth of output and living standards. We do not challenge the role of capital or the implication that the return to capital changes very little. The return to labor changes much more. We do not impose our ideas of the desirable extent of income distribution. The workers in our model are voters who choose their preferred tax rate and redistribution. They are aware that an increased tax rate to …nance redistribution lowers investment in productivity enhancing investments that add to their future consumption.
Our analysis …ts the contours of growth experience. As workers learn, their skills, productivity and incomes increase. They save more, acquire real assets especially housing. They spend to educate their o¤spring, and they vote for or against redistribution and taxation. In our earlier work, Meltzer and Richard (1981) , we showed that rational voters choose a tax rate consistent with the most basic economic theory. They decide whether they want increased taxes to …nance more redistribution (consumption today), or lower tax rates to spur investment and future consumption. In the growth model here, the same choice remains central.
The Economic Model
We begin by modeling consumers and calculating their lifetime consumption by maximizing their utility. Consumers are endowed with di¤erent relative levels of productivity, indexed by n; and one unit of time. A consumer with relative productivity n maximizes his lifetime utility of consumption and leisure:
where
is his consumption stream,`n = f`n t g 1 0 is his labor stream, and is the discount rate. There is a government which levies a linear tax on income at rate t at time t and uses the proceeds for redistribution, equally per capita. The budget constraint for a consumer with productivity n is
where nw t is the wage per unit of labor at time t and t w t is amount redistributed at time t: Each individual is a price taker in the labor market, takes the processes f t g; fw t g; and f t g as given and chooses fc n t g and f`n t g to maximize utility. The standard Bellman equation for optimal control is 3 0 = max
where J n (w t ; t ; t ) is the value function for a consumer with relative productivity n. The standard …rst-order conditions for equation (3) yield
The maximum fraction of time devoted to working is ; as can be seen by setting t = 0 in equation (4). Since labor must be positive there is a minimum level of relative productivity, t ; below which consumers are voluntarily unemployed, living on their redistribution:
We call t the voluntary unemployment productivity. Optimal consumption is
Notice that consumption is increasing and ordered by relative productivity for all choices of t and t :
Relative productivity is distributed lognormally, ln n N (0; t ); so that the median relative productivity is m = 1 and the mean relative productivity is n t = e 1 2 t > 1: Hence nw t is the absolute productivity of a consumer with relative productivity n: Since the median consumer has productivity m = 1; w t is the absolute productivity of the median consumer.
To understand how productivity and economic growth a¤ect the income distribution and redistribution in a mature economy such as the U.S. or western Europe, we need to consider change in relative productivity, t ; as well as change in absolute productivity, w t . An increase in w t increases the wage earned by all workers, regardless of their level of productivity. An increase in t is meant to capture the e¤ect of technological change with disparate e¤ects, such as the computerization of production the U.S. experienced in the past 40 years. Mean productivity normalized hours worked at time t; t ; is:
The government's budget is balanced in that the per capita spending on redistribution, w t t ; equals the tax revenues, w t t t :
Everything in this economy is a function of t ; t and w t . It is obvious from equation (7) that t is a function of t and t : Substituting equation (5) into equation (4) we …nd that`n
Solving equation (8) for t , substituting the result into equation (5) and then solving for t gives:
is the average fraction of full-time equivalent, productivity-adjusted, units worked. Substituting equation (10) into equation (8) gives:
Finally, substituting equations (9), (10), and (12) into equation (6) gives:
In preparation for determining the size of government we show that selecting t is an equivalent to selecting t : This can be seen by showing that t is a strictly increasing function of t :
Hence the mapping from t to t is continuous and strictly increasing, so that setting t is equivalent to setting t : Furthermore, increasing (decreasing) t is equivalent to increasing (decreasing) t . Finally, we determine the mean number of labor units worked per capita,
Hence, the fraction of full time labor worked per capita at time t, is`t= and the fraction of full time labor worked per employed person, L t ; is
The Distribution of Income
We can now show that regardless of how tax rates are determined, the distribution of pre-tax income widens as taxes rise. This widening has nothing to do with technological change or the privileges of the rich. The widening of the distribution of income is the direct consequence of the incentives created by increasing taxes and redistribution. The income of a consumer with relative productivity n at time t is
= w t n`n t f or n t :
Substituting equation (9) into equation (19) gives
Assuming that he works, the median consumer's income is
The average income of all consumers, both those who work and those who live on redistribution, is
Higher taxes causes the average income of all consumers (which in equilibrium must equal the average consumption of all consumers) to fall:
A commonly used measure of the dispersion of income is the ratio of mean to median income:
Di¤erentiating we get
so that the ratio of mean to median income rises as tax rates increase. In fact all consumers with productivity above (below) median increase (reduce) their income relative to median income as taxes rise:
Another commonly used measure of the dispersion of income is the fraction earned by the top k%. The upper k% begins with the consumer with relative productivity
For example, the upper 1% begins with relative productivity n t (0:01) = exp( t N 1 (0:01)) or n t (0:01) e 2:33 t and the top 10% begins with productivity n t (0:1) e 1:28 t :
The total income of the top k% of consumers is
The fraction of income earned by the top k% is
The ratio of the total income of consumers in the top k% relative to median pre-tax income is
Di¤erentiating equation (31) with respect to t shows that:
Again, "the rich get richer" relative to the median as taxes rise. Again, this is an inevitable consequence of taxation and redistribution. There is much discussion in the media, and even among academics, of how rising income dispersion is evidence of a more "unequal" society. This is, of course, very misleading because funds collected in taxes are redistributed so that the distribution of consumption actually narrows with increased taxes. The welfare implication of increased taxation is a more equal, "fair" society, despite an increase in the dispersion of incomes. In fact all consumers with productivity above (below) median reduce (increase) their consumption relative to median consumption as taxes rise:
What about the top k%? The consumption of the top k% is
The consumption of the top k% falls relative to median consumption as taxes increase:
The Median Voter
Until now all consumer have been price takers who have no in ‡uence over government tax policy. Romer (1975) and Roberts (1977) shows that if the ordering of individual consumption is independent of the choice of t and t , the median voter is decisive in a majority rule election to set the tax rate. So the median voter is continuously decisive in elections for f t g:
We now turn to analyzing how the median voter would prefer to set tax rates. The choice of tax rates depends on how taxes e¤ect the growth rate of wages. We assume that the growth of wages is due to learning by doing or on the job training. Time spent working contributes to the growth rate of wages. The amount of learning by doing at time t is proportional to t ; the full-time equivalent units of productivity adjusted labor worked at time t; there is no contribution to learning by doing from those who do not work. We assume that the growth rate of wages (or median productivity) is
where g t is a technological productivity multiplier which determines how much each full-time equivalent of productivity normalized labor increases wages. In a mature economy, changes to g t are mainly due to business cycle e¤ects. We assume that
where g t is an arbitrary well-behaved function of g t : Because the consumer's utility function is logarithmic, it will turn out that the exact form of g t is irrelevant as long as it is independent of t : We assume that the process for t is
Again, as long as t is independent of t ; its exact speci…cation is irrelevant. The reason that we do not need to specify the exact form of g t or t is the myopic decision making resulting from logarithmic utility. The Bellman equation for the median voter is
where we have suppressed the superscript m. We conjecture that J(w t ; g t ) = ln w t + j(g t ; t ):
Substituting equations (6), (9), and (40) into equation (39) we …nd
The derivative of equation (41) with respect to t is:
(42) The standard conditions for an optimal t are H( t ; g t ; t ) = 0
and
Economic Growth
The growth rate of the economy at time t; t ; equals the growth rate of aggregate consumption:
and e n is the unit normal probability density function. There are three e¤ects on economic growth captured in equation (45). The …rst term, g t t ; is the growth rate due to current learning by doing, which is smaller the higher are taxes since
The second term captures the direct reduction in the current growth rate caused by consumers experiencing increasing taxes. Whenever taxes are increasing, so is the level of voluntary unemployment, implying the growth rate of the economy falls. The third term is the e¤ect of technological change on growth. Since the coe¢ cient of t in equation (45) is positive, an increase in the dispersion of skills causes higher growth.
Increases in t ; ceteris paribus, causes the government to grow. To see this we need some preliminary calculations. First we need the partial derivative of H with respect to t :
Assuming the median voter works, t < 1 so that ln t < 0; implying that H > 0: Taking the total derivative of equation (43) with respect to t; we get
Because H H > 0; positive t causes t to increase, which means taxes rise. Increasing dispersion in relative productivity causes higher tax rates and increased government growth.
Whenever absolute productivity is increasing, g t > 0; the economy grows faster. To see this, we substitute equation (48) into equation (45) so we can re-write the growth rate of the economy as
Because Hg H > 0; increases in g t causes t to increase so the economy grows faster. The e¤ect of an increase in dispersion, t ; on the growth rate of the economy is ambiguous because the bracketed term in equation (50) is of indeterminate sign. The …rst term, which is the direct e¤ect of t on t ; is always positive, but the second term, which is the indirect e¤ect of increasing taxes, is negative.
Estimation
We now estimate the model using US data from 1967 -2011 and 1950 -2011 , UK data from 1962 -2011 , and French data from 1978 -2009 . The choice of estimation periods re ‡ects the …rst and last dates when the necessary data are available. 4 Our data sources are in We estimate two of the unknown model states fg t ; t g; the parameters and the number of annual hours equivalent to full time labor, ; by minimizing the sum of squared errors in matching four data time series for each country:
1. The growth rate of the economy, t ; which is calculated using equation (45) is compared to the Real Growth Rate of Per Capita GDP.
2. Labor participation rate per worker, L t ; which is calculated using equation (18) is compared to the Average Annual Hours Worked per Engaged Person.
3. The ratio of mean to median income, r t ;which is calculated using equation (25) is compared to the Ratio of Mean to Median Household Income; OR the fraction of income earned by the top 10%, t (0:1); calculated using equation (30) is compared to the Income Share of the Top 10% taken from the The World Top Income Database.
4. The tax rate, t ;which is calculated using equation (10) is compared to the total government burden which we measure by Total Government Expenditures/GDP.
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We set the time discounting factor = 4%: 6 When reporting the results of each of the estimations we show a graph with four panels, corresponding to the four comparisons of model to data listed above.
Median productivity, w t ; which is the third state variable is computed from the productivity index, P t : We equate average total output calculated by using productivity-adjusted labor, equation (22), with average total output calculated using unadjusted labor:
Solving equation (51) we get
The estimation is done by a numerical search. The search steps are:
1. Make a starting guess for the states f t ; t g and and :
2. For each t; solve equation (43) for g t .
3. Compute t ; L t ; r t and t .
4. Compute the sum of squared errors.
5. Update the states, and using a Nelder-Mead algorithm.
6. Repeat steps (2) - (5) until convergence.
The United States
We estimate our model for the United States over two di¤erent time periods. During the …rst period from 1967 to 2011 we use annual observations on real per capita GDP growth rate, average annual hours worked per engaged person, the ratio of mean to median household income, and the burden of government which is total government expenditures/GDP. During the second, longer period we substitute the income share of the top 10% for the ratio of mean to median household income which is not available prior to 1967. We begin with data from the US from 1967 -2011. Figure 1 shows a comparison of actual data and model calculations. Obviously the …ts of the model to the data are excellent. The r 2 for the …t of actual data to the model are 55.4%, 77.6%, 98.1%, and 86.5%, for growth, hours per employed person, mean to median income, and the tax rate, respectively. The downward trend in hours worked per employed person re ‡ects an international trend as we see below. Mean to median income and government expenditures as a fraction of GDP have both trended upward as a result of increased dispersion in productivity as shown in Figure 2 . Figure 2 shows the optimal estimated states, fg t ; t ; w t g; and t ; from 1967 -2011. The productivity growth multiplier, shown in Panel 1, increased from 1967, reached a peak in 2000, and declined afterward. The dispersion of relative productivity, shown in Panel 2, increased steadily from 1967 through 2000, but has leveled o¤ since then. In contrast to the other state variables, w t grows throughout the sample, re ‡ecting the continuous growth in US productivity. There has been a steady upward trend in the productivity cuto¤ for voluntary unemployment. To get a longer time period for estimation we have to substitute the income fraction of the top 10% for the ratio of mean to median household income in all three countries.
7 Figure 3 reports the estimation in the US from 1950 -2011. The …t of the model to the data is better than in 1967 -2011 with r 2 of 88.4%, 88.6%, 77.5%, and 96.6%, respectively. The data trends are similar to 1967 -2011, except we see that the fraction of income earned by the top 10% did not begin its upward march until the 1980s. Figure 4 shows the estimated optimal states in the US from 1950-2011. The interesting di¤erence between these charts and Figure 2 is that productivity dispersion did not begin to grow until the 1980s when the share of the top 10% also began to increase.
United Kingdom
We estimate our model for the United Kingdom from 1962 -2011. 8 We use annual observations on real per capita GDP growth rate, average annual hours worked per engaged person, the income share of the top 10%, and the burden of government which is total government expenditures/GDP. Figure 5 shows a comparison of actual data and model calculations. The …ts of the model to the data are very good, but not as good as the US. The r 2 are , 67.4%, 71.7%, 86.3%, and 35.4%, respectively. As in the US, the income share of the top 10% began trending upward in the 1980s, although the shares are lower in the UK than the US. Figure 6 shows the estimated optimal states in the UK from 1962 -2011. Notice in Panel 2 that, as in the US, relative productivity dispersion began to increase in the 1980s coincident with the increase of the income share of the top 10%.
France
We estimate our model for France from 1978 -2009. but not as good as the US or UK. The r 2 are 60.2%, 80.2%, -70.7%, and 79.5%, respectively. The …t of the model to the actual income share of the top 10% is poor; since 1995 the model requires a larger share for the top 10% than the tax data shows. Figure 8 shows the estimated optimal states in France from 1978 -2009. Notice in Panel 2 that, as in the US and UK, relative productivity dispersion began to increase in the 1980s coincident with the increase of the income share of the top 10%.
Technological Specialization and the Dispersion of Productivity
In all three countries, an important cause for the change in the distribution of productivity is technological specialization. New technologies result in divergent growth in productivity, which increase t . Increased returns to specialization cause the distribution of relative productivity to widen. Evidently, as shown in Panel 2 of Figures 2, 4, 6, and 8, there has been a signi…cant widening in the dispersion of relative productivity, t ; in the U.S., UK and France, respectively. This dispersion has been attributed to the growth of computer technology.
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Those who are able to lever their skills through technology have become relatively more productive in comparison with the median worker. This technological change has increased the growth rate of the economy and the dispersion of pre-tax income.
Statistics
We compute the model parameters by minimizing the sum of squared errors which is equivalent to maximizing the likelihood. Hence we can …nd the standard errors of the model parameters using the outer product of gradients estimator. The two unknown parameters in each country are the number of annual hours comprising full time work, ; and the maximum fraction of time devoted to work, : Our estimated parameters are shown in Table 3 . The estimated full time annual hours worked ( ) ranges from 1562 in the US from 1950 -2011 to 1875 in the UK from 1962 -2011.
Conclusion
Our contribution to the large and very diverse literature on growth and income distribution takes the form of a general equilibrium model of growth in labor income and consumption. The tax rate, as measured by the total government burden, and the amount spent on redistribution are endogenous variables. In developed, democratic countries voters chose the tax rate in single issue elections. The budget is balanced, so spending and tax collections are equal. By assumption, all spending is for redistribution.
The model extends our earlier work on a static economy, Meltzer and Richard (1981) , to a growing economy. Consumers are endowed with di¤erent initial levels of productivity. Output and labor income change, as does productivity and, with it, the distribution of income among income groups. In our model, labor productivity changes as workers learn more productive skills on the job and as technology changes. This changes relative and absolute incomes and the spread between the top and the bottom (or other aspects) of the income distribution.
Our model analyzes consumption over time. Consumption is an endogenous variable that depends, inter alia, on taxation. Voters choose the tax rate in periodic elections. Sometimes they choose to increase current consumption by increasing tax rates and redistribution. Since higher tax rates reduce investment in learning by doing, the growth rate falls. Voters can vote to increase growth by subsequently voting to reduce tax rates to increase future consumption. The spread between top and bottom of the income distribution declines. Estimation of the model shows good correspondence to the historical data for the tax rate, average hours worked per employed person, the distribution of pre-tax income, and the growth rate of the economy which means the model captures the main facts about redistribution and economic growth.
The model answers the puzzling result emphasized by Piketty (2014) . As did Karl Marx, Piketty concludes that because the return on capital repeatedly exceeds the growth rate of developed economies and does not change much over time, developed economies will face ever-increasing capital stocks. Since returns to capital go mainly to the highest income groups, the distribution of income widens over time and will continue to do so. Another possibility, of course, is that capital owners either consume or donate to charity the capital output in excess of the economic growth rate, so that capital does not accumulate faster than the economy grows. The puzzle for Piketty's conjecture is why there is no evidence anywhere that the capital stock has approached saturation. That fact opens the way for an alternative explanation of the relative constancy of the return to capital. Unlike Piketty who bases his conclusion on a comparison of the before tax income of the top 1 or 0.1 percent to before redistribution to the lowest income groups, we compare incomes available for consumption by the di¤erent income classes. Piketty's choice greatly overstates what has happened in developed countries. Our measure is more closely related to income after tax and after redistribution, hence to consumption. In our model, labor is the source of income. Unlike the return to capital, the return to labor has increased considerably over time. It is subject to cyclical and other changes in relative share. And it changes with productivity growth, thereby increasing at times the relative shares of those in the working classes while reducing their relative share in periods of low growth, and therefore consumption. As Kuznets conjectured, we must look to changes in labor income to explain changes in the spread between high and low income shares. Data for the three countries we study support our model and the Kuznets'conjecture.
